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Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller
I. The Legal Background
When a class action settles, class counsel is generally
entitled to a fee award, either under a fee-shifting stat-
ute,1 or through application of the common fund
doctrine.2 The amount paid to class counsel must be
approved by the court. With respect to fee-shifting
statutes and awards of fees under the common fund
rule, the fees is to be paid by the defendant, which
does not have the ability to control the reasonable-
ness of class counsel’s fee demands. Without judicial
supervision, counsel could make unreasonable fee
requests. In the case of fees from a common fund,
counsel’s request for compensation creates a direct
conflict of interest with the class. Because class mem-
bers are dispersed, disorganized, and typically have a
relatively small stake in the outcome of the litigation,
the class cannot protect itself against an unreasonable
fee request. Again, court protection is required to
prevent counsel from enriching themselves at the
What Is a Reasonable Attorney Fee?
An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements
Editors’ Note: This article is based on Theodore Eisenberg
and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Attorney Fees in Class Action
Settlements: An Empirical Study,” 1 Journal of Empiri-
cal Legal Studies 27 (2004). The abridged version
printed here is used with permission.
Determining an appropriate fee is a difficult task fac-
ing trial court judges in class action litigation. But
courts rarely rely on empirical research to assess a fee’s
reasonableness, due, at least in part, to the relative
paucity of available information. Existing empirical
studies of attorney fees in class action cases are lim-
ited in scope, and generally do not control for im-
portant variables. To help fill this gap, we analyzed
data from all state and federal class actions with re-
ported fee decisions from 1993 to 2002 in which the
fee and class recovery could be determined with rea-
sonable confidence.
We find that the level of client recovery is by far
the most important determinant of the attorney fee
amount. A scaling effect exists, with fees constituting
a lower percent of the client’s recovery as the client’s
recovery increases. The relation between fees and re-
covery is remarkably regular, and can be observed both
in cases in which no fee-shifting statute applies, and
in cases in which the plaintiff had a right to seek re-
imbursement under a fee-shifting statute. The pres-
ence of high risk is associated with higher fees, as is
the presence of the case in federal rather than state
court. Contrary to popular belief, we find no solid
evidence that attorney fees increased during the pe-
riod studied.
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expense of the class. Class and de-
rivative actions also present the
specter that counsel will “sell out”
the class or the shareholders by
agreeing to a low recovery in ex-
change for a generous fee.
Many courts have adopted one of two methodolo-
gies for determining fees: the lodestar method, or the
percentage method. Under the lodestar method,
courts multiply the reasonable number of hours ex-
pended by counsel by a reasonable hourly rate, and
then adjust the product for various factors.3 The lode-
star method has numerous flaws, however. Courts
cannot easily determine either reasonable hours or a
reasonable hourly rate, and there are few protections
against counsel exaggerating either or both figures.
The calculation thus involves the courts in time-con-
suming and mind-numbing bean counting, and risks
transforming the fee determination into a collateral
lawsuit.  Standards for determining any multiplier for
the lodestar are unclear and potentially arbitrary, and
the method creates a perverse incentive for counsel
to waste time in order to run up the bill once a vic-
tory of some sort appears reasonably certain.
The percentage method of fee calculation fares
better along these dimensions. Under this method,
which resembles the contingency fee in individual tort
cases, the court multiplies the amount recovered on
behalf of the class by a percentage factor. The per-
centage method is easy to calculate, does not involve
the court in fee audits, and does not create incentives
to waste time. Although generally preferable to the
lodestar method in cases where it can be used, the
percentage method is also imperfect. In some cases
(for example, actions for injunctive relief, or cases
involving non-pecuniary relief, such as hard-to-value
coupons) the amount recovered may be difficult or
impossible to quantify. Determining the proper per-
centage may be difficult, especially when the case is
unusual in dimension (very large or very small), or
especially difficult or risky. The percentage method
provides an incentive for counsel to settle early in
order to avoid expending low-return hours. And,
unless adjusted for risk, the percentage method tends
to over-compensate counsel in easy cases where the
probability of recovery is high. Perhaps in recogni-
Table 1. Fee Percent Summary by Legal Regime and Case Category
     Non-fee-shifting cases            Fee-shifting cases
Category Mean Median Std. dev. N Mean Median Std. dev. N
Antitrust 21.4 23.3 9.9 36 - - - -
Civil Rights 37.0 37.0 1.4 2 26.1 31.3 17.3 7
Consumer 16.2 13.0 10.6 52 55.2 51.8 20.2 18
Corporate 20.4 20.0 11.5 15 - - - -
Employment 25.3 23.4 9.6 7 37.5 31.8 21.7 16
ERISA/ Pension 22.0 24.0 7.8 7 24.4 16.2 26.4 15
Mass Tort 18.3 18.7 7.0 7 - - - -
Securities 24.1 25.0 8.9 142 - - - -
Tax Refund 13.1 11.5 9.7 6 - - - -
Tort 17.9 19.6 9.2 10 - - - -
Other 24.8 27.5 8.1 19 22.5 23.0 20.4 3
Total 21.9 23.2 9.9 303 37.5 33.0 25.9 59
Source: Reported class action settlements with fee awards, 1993-2002.
Court protection is required to prevent counsel from
enriching themselves at the expense of the class.
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tion that both the lodestar and percentage methods
imperfectly estimate a reasonable fee, some
courts adopt a blended approach that checks the per-
centage method for reasonableness against a lodestar
calculation.
Regardless of the methodology used, courts could
benefit from reviewing empirical evidence on the
amounts awarded in analogous cases. Courts in this
setting engage in a process of appraisal, and any ap-
praisal can properly take account of comparable trans-
actions. In fact, courts frequently cite prior court
precedents in which fees have been awarded. But
courts almost never examine empirical research that
could potentially provide more systematic and statis-
tically controlled information about awards.
II. Data and Empirical Results
To assess the factors that influence fees, we assembled
a comprehensive database of published cases. We
searched the WESTLAW “All Cases” database. Then
we checked those searchs’ results against a search of
the LEXIS “Mega” database using the same search
terms. We also compiled lists of citations in the cases
found with these search requests, and included any
additional cases meeting the basic search criteria. We
further checked the list against the CCH Federal Se-
curities and Trade Regulation Reporters. We sometimes
gathered additional information about case charac-
teristics from other sources. These searches yielded an
initial list of 449 cases. Two of the most important
variables for our purposes were fees and client recov-
eries. The fee was ascertainable in 417 class action
cases. The client recovery was usually available from
the opinion, and a useable figure was coded in 370
cases. The coding of these and other variables is ex-
plained in more detail elsewhere.4
We discuss fee award levels separately in relation
to four major influences: legal regime (fee-shifting or
not), case category, client recovery level, and time.
Table 1 summarizes fees as a percent of recoveries by
fee-shifting status and case category. The “Total” row
shows substantial differences between fee-shifting and
non-fee-shifting cases, and the higher fee percents in
fee-shifting cases. The table also breaks down case cat-
egories in which counsel fees are awarded in class ac-
tion cases. Securities law class actions tend to
dominate, comprising over 40 percent of non-fee-
shifting cases. But other categories, including anti-
trust and consumer cases, contribute substantial
numbers of cases. Securities cases also tend to have
high award percentages (though not the highest), but
this result is not statistically significant when one
controls for other factors. In non-fee-shifting cases,
Table 2. Fee Percent Summary by Fee Method and Legal Regime
Non-fee-shifting cases             Fee-shifting cases
Fee method Mean Median Std. dev. N Mean Median Std. dev. N
Percent 22.3 24.0 9.9 197 26.7 30.0 14.1 17
Mixed percent/lodestar 22.9 25.0 9.0 68 24.3 23.0 10.8 9
Pure lodestar 17.2 16.5 10.5 38 46.6 50.1 28.4 33
Source: Reported class action settlements with fee awards, 1993-2002.
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the axiomatic one-third fee is inaccurate; a fee of 20
to 25 percent of the recovery better describes reality.
Descriptive statistics about the fee percent
awarded, now broken down by the court’s method of
computing fees, appear in Table 2. Consistent with
Table 1, Table 2 shows higher percentage awards in
fee-shifting cases. It also shows that the lodestar
method differs in its effect depending on the degree
to which it dominates. In non-fee-shifting cases, the
pure percent method and the mixed method (in which
both percent and lodestar play a role) yield quite simi-
lar fee percents. The data indicate that the pure lode-
star method tends to reduce the fee percent.
The pattern shifts in fee-shifting cases. Now the
pure lodestar method tends to increase awards com-
pared to the other methods which may be employed
in the settlement context.
Figure 1 shows the strong correlation between the
fee amount and the client recovery. Each small circle
represents a case’s fee amount and client recovery in
the published opinion data. As the client recovery in-
creases, so does the fee. This is not, in itself, particu-
larly noteworthy. The surprising feature of the pattern
is how tight the relation is. To the extent cases depart
from the pattern, they tend to do so by having low
fee amounts. That is, the data points most distant
from the central pattern tend to lie below, not above,
the pattern.
In addition to the scatterplot of individual award-
recovery points, Figure 1 contains two lines. Each line
represents the best-fitting regression line for a set
of data. The solid line represents the best-fitting re-
gression line for non-fee-shifting cases. The line
represented by dashes represents the best-fitting re-
gression line for fee-shifting cases. These one-variable
regression models explain 89 percent of the variance
in non-fee-shifting reported cases, and 90 percent of
the variance in fee-shifting reported cases. Also rea-
sonably impressive is the similarity of the fee-shifting
and non-fee-shifting regression lines (slopes of 0.83
for non-fee-shifting cases, and 0.74 for fee-shifting
cases). No obvious theoretical reason exists to predict
this close fit between the results in both the fee-shift-
ing and non-fee-shifting regimes. The fact that fees
and recovery correlate so closely across the two re-
gimes suggests that courts may be engaging in an
intuitive approach that awards fees in relation to class
recovery, regardless of the formal methodology be-
ing used to calculate the fee.
The relation between the fee percent (in contrast
to the fee amount) and client recovery is also of in-
terest. Figure 2 explores this relation. Like Figure 1,
the figure combines a scatterplot of individual cases
with separate best-fitting regression lines for fee-shift-
ing and non-fee-shifting cases. In addition, the fig-
ure separately identifies fee-shifting reported cases,
designated with an “f,” and non-fee-shifting reported
cases, designated with an “n.”
Two major points emerge from the figure. First,
the data reveal a scale effect. As client recovery in-
creases, the fee percent decreases. The regression lines
share a substantially negative correlation with the size
of the client’s recovery. The simple regression mod-
els explain substantially less of the fee percent than
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they did of the fee level. In non-fee-shifting cases, the
model explains 25 percent of the variance; in fee-shift-
ing cases, it explains 57 percent of the variance. Sec-
ond, fee-shifting cases dominate in
the upper left quadrant of the fig-
ure—corresponding to low-recov-
ery, high-fee percent cases. They
are scarce in the high client-recov-
ery range of cases.
The hypothesis that attorney
fees are increasing over time finds little support in our
data. Figure 3 shows the essential facts. Neither the
mean nor the median level of fee awards has increased
over time, either for non-fee-shifting or fee-shifting
cases. In one sense, this should come as no surprise.
The fee level is fundamentally linked to the client’s
recovery, and client recoveries have not increased over
time.5 In another sense, the result is intriguing. No
real-dollar increase in the level of fee awards in major
cases over the course of a decade is not the sort of fact
we are accustomed to hearing. Impressions of fees as
ever-increasing need greater empirical support than
has been offered to date.
We explored the relation to fee awards of the above
and other factors in regression models that account
for multiple factors.6 The models confirm that the
overwhelming determinant of fee amounts is the
amount of the recovery for the class. This is not a sur-
prising result for common fund cases, given that fees
in many such cases are determined as a percent of the
class recovery. In fee-shifting cases, however, gross re-
covery for the class is also a significant determinant,
even though—in theory, at least—court-awarded fees
in such cases are not necessarily a function of the
amount of class recovery.
Regression analysis also confirms other key find-
ings, and supports additional findings. Regression
models show that the scaling effect suggested in Fig-
ure 2 (decrease of the fee as a percentage of class re-
covery as the class recovery increases) survives
controlling for other factors. Risk influences fee
awards in the expected manner. When courts men-
tion risk in a way that we interpret as reflecting high
risk, or when we could otherwise confidently code risk
as high, there is a significant association with both
the fee level and the fee percent. Cases we interpret as
being low-risk, on the other hand, are associated with
lower fees. We find little evidence that fees as a per-
cent of the recovery are higher in state court class
actions than in federal court actions. If anything, the
opposite is true. This federal-state difference is a bit
surprising in light of the business community’s sup-
port for legislation shifting more class action cases
from state to federal court. Regression analysis also
confirms the simple story of Figure 3. We find no
robust evidence of an increase in fees over time. We
The hypothesis that attorney fees are increasing over
time finds little support in our data.
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also find no evidence that the presence of soft relief,
such as coupons, influences fee levels.
Focusing on a subset of the data—those cases with
a computable lodestar amount reported—suggests
that, in comparison to the client recovery, the lode-
star fares poorly as a cost-effective way of calculating
the fee, especially in non-fee-shifting cases. Models
using the client recovery are more efficient in explain-
ing fee awards. Producing a client-recovery-based fee
requires less effort than producing a lodestar fee, since
the lodestar requires judicial scrutiny of hours and de-
termination of hourly rates.
III. A Practical Application—
A Table to Check on Fee Awards
Our study may assist courts in evaluating requests for
attorney fees in class action cases. Because our study
finds an overwhelming correlation between class re-
covery and attorney fees, the court can initially ex-
amine these two variables in cases in which the size of
class recovery can be estimated. The court can com-
pare the fee request in a given case with average awards
in cases of similar magnitude. If the request is rela-
tively close to average awards in cases with similar
characteristics, the court may feel a degree of confi-
dence in approving the award. If the request is sig-
nificantly higher than amounts awarded in past cases,
the court should inquire further. The methodology
is more appropriate for non-fee-shifting cases, in
which, as Table 1 shows, the range of fee award per-
cents varies less than in fee-shifting cases. Accord-
ingly, we use only non-fee-shifting cases in the
following analysis.
To provide numerical guidance, we divide the cli-
ent recoveries in our published opinion data by decile,
assigning approximately 10 percent of the cases to
one of ten ordered groups. For each client recovery
decile, we compute the mean and median fee per-
cents as well as the standard deviation for the pub-
lished opinion data set. Since the deciles contain
approximately equal numbers of cases, each fee per-
cent computation is based on similarly-sized samples.
Table 3 reports the results.
The table’s first column identifies each decile. The
second column shows the range of client recovery for
the decile—for example, less than $1.4 million in the
first decile. The next column shows the mean client
recovery within the decile. For example, in the 30 to
40 percent decile, the mean client recovery was $7.2
Table 3. Fee Percent at Deciles of Client Recoveries
Client recovery Recovery range Mean recovery Mean fee Median Standard dev.,
     decile in decile ($ millions) in decile ($ millions) percent fee percent fee percent
Less than 10% < 1.4 0.8 29.5 30.0 5.9
10 to 20% 1.4 to 3.1 2.3 26.5 25.0 10.9
20 to 30% 3.1 to 5.2 4.3 25.0 29.4 7.9
30 to 40% 5.2 to 9.7 7.2 25.6 26.0 7.0
40 to 50% 9.7 to 15 12.0 22.7 22.4 8.4
50 to 60% 15 to 22 18.8 22.0 24.5 8.6
60 to 70% 22 to 38 30.4 19.0 19.0 9.9
70 to 80% 38 to 79 53.7 16.9 15.5 10.2
80 to 90% 79 to 190 122.2 17.6 15.0 9.2
Greater than 90% > 190 929.1 12.0 10.1 8.1
Note: Client recovery amounts are in millions of inflation-adjusted $2002
Source: Reported class action settlements with fee awards.
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million (with a range of $5.2 to $9.7 million). The
next three columns show the summary statistics for
the fee percent within each client recovery decile.
With respect to fee percents, Table 3 shows, for
example, that the mean fee percent in the lowest
client-recovery decile in the decided cases data was
29.5, the median was 30.0, and the standard devia-
tion was 5.9. In the highest decile of recovery, the
mean client recovery was $929 million. The mean fee
percent was 12.0 percent, with a median of 10.1 per-
cent, and a standard deviation of 8.1 percent. Clearly,
a substantial scaling effect is at work.
Our suggestion is that fee requests which fall within
one standard deviation above or below the mean
should be viewed as generally reasonable, and should
be approved by the court unless other reasons are pre-
sented to question the fee. Fee requests which fall
within one to two standard deviations above or be-
low the mean should be viewed as potentially reason-
able, but in need of affirmative justification. Fee
requests falling more than two standard deviations
above or below the mean should be viewed as pre-
sumptively unreasonable; attorneys seeking fees above
this amount should be required to come forward with
compelling reasons to support their request.
To illustrate how a court could use this informa-
tion, suppose class counsel requests a fee of $12 mil-
lion, equal to 40 percent of a recovery of $30 million.
Because this is more than two standard deviations
above the mean fee award percent at this recovery
level, the court should presumptively disapprove the
request unless powerful reasons counsel in favor
of approval. In evaluating the fee according to this
methodology, the court could appropriately take into
account factors such as case type and risk, which this
study has shown tend to influence the amount of
the fee.
IV. Conclusion
The single most important factor determining the fee
in class action cases is the size of the client’s recovery.
As a percent of client recovery, fees tend to fall no-
ticeably below the widely-quoted one-third level,
ranging from about 30 percent in the smallest cases
down to about 10 percent in the largest cases. We find
no robust evidence that attorney fees in common fund
cases have increased over the ten-year period studied.
Fees tend to be higher in federal court than in state
court cases. Fees as a percentage of the recovery tend
to be higher in high-risk cases than in other cases. We
find no evidence that either soft relief included in the
estimated benefit for the class, or soft relief that is not
included in the estimated benefit, has any upward or
downward effect on the fee award.
We find robust evidence of a scaling effect. The
percent of the recovery that goes to attorneys decreases
as the size of the recovery increases. This effect can be
interpreted as supporting the underlying theory for
class actions. As similar cases are aggregated, the effi-
ciency gains yield an increased net return to clients.
1. Fee-shifting statutes provide that defendants must pay
the reasonable attorneys’ fees of prevailing plaintiffs. E.g.,
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000).
2. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S.
240, 259 (1975).
3. E.g., Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789 (2002).
4. Theodore Eisenberg and Geoffrey P. Miller, “Attorney
Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study,” 1
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